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B.: Limitation of Actions--Statute of Limitations Applied to Quasi-Co

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
to include such a payment as this in the term "gift"; therefore
the question was one of statutory interpretation, which is a question of law. The argument made in the dissenting opinion is that
the sole differentiating factor between a payment which is a gift
and a payment which is compensation is the intent with which
the payment is made, and intent is always a question of fact. This
would be perfectly correct if it were conceded that the statutory
tax-exempt "gift" is the same as the ordinary gift referred to in
the law of personal property, but whether such be the case calls
for a judicial interpretation of the statute and the consequent decision of a question of law. Hence the Bogardus case may be reconciled on the basis that it involved a question of statutory interpretation, although this is not clearly set forth in the opinion.
H. A. W., JR.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS -

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPmIED

TO QUASI-CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS ARISING UPON ANTICIPATORY BREACH
OF AN EXISTING CONTRACT. - Plaintiff paid defendant premiums

on three industrial insurance policies from November, 1921, to
September, 1932. In 1932, the plaintiff's request for payment of
the cash value of the policies was refused on the ground that the
policies had lapsed in 1921, 1922, and 1925 respectively. The
plaintiff had no knowledge or notice of this fact and in 1935 instituted this action in quasi contract to recover the premiums paid
since the policies lapsed. Defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations on the theory that the Statute commenced to run when
the defendant treated the policies as having lapsed.' "Held,that
the Statute begins to run only when the injured party manifests
his intention to treat the anticipatory repudiation as a "rescission"
or as a breach. Harless v. Western and Southern Life Insurance
Co.,
West Virginia has frequently upheld a right of action based
3
on an anticipatory repudiation of an executory contract and now
joins a majority of other courts in allowing suit upon a repudiation
1 It was conceded that the five year statute of limitations was the correct
limitation to apply in this case. W. VA. REv. CODE (Mihie, 1937) e. 55, art.
2, § 6.,
2192 S. E. 137 (W. Va. 1937).
3 Davis v. Grand Rapids School Furniture Co., 41 W. Va. 717, 24 S. E. 630
(1896); Connolly v. Bollinger, 67 W. Va. 37, 67 S. E. 71 (1910). For a complete discussion of W. Va. cases see Riley, Anticipatory Breach in West Virginia (1925) 31 W. VA. L. Q. 182.
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of an insurance policy.4 This is undoubtedly a sound extension
of the doctrine5
In applying the Statute of Limitations to cases of anticipatory
repudiation when the breach is accepted and acted upon, most
courts distinguish between (1) the right of action on the contract
for damages, and (2) the right to rescind and recover in quasi contract for benefits conferred. 6 In case one, the better view, which
is not undisputed however, seems to be that the statute runs only
from the time of the election to sue for the anticipatory breach on
the theory that the repudiation continues until acted upon or retracted and the claim is not "stale" as long as the defendant can
make an effective tender of performance.7 In case two, the Statute
starts to run either upon the breach or upon the election to rescind
and sue in quasi contract.
lost courts and writers take the
position that the Statute runs from the time of the breach regardless of when the election to rescind is made, on the theory that at
the date of the breach, a cause of action in favor of the promisee
arises and it only remains for him to elect which remedy he will
choose." If he elects a remedy which requires him to proceed on
4 Erwin v. World Mutual Health & Acci. Ins. Co., 122 Pa. Super. Ct. 203,
186 Atl. 260 (1936) ; Alexander v. Durham L. Ins. Co., 181 S. C. 331, 187 S. B.
425 (1936). Notes (1927) 48 A. L. R. 107; (1937) 107 A. L. R. 1233.
Contra: Gilbert v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 264 N. Y. S. 610 (1933); Kelly v.
Security Mut. L. Ins. Co., 186 N. Y. 16, 78 iN. E. 584 (1906) (the plaintiff's
'remedy is by suit in equitf to have the policy reinstated) ; Porter v. Supreme
Council A. L. H., 183 Mass. 326, 67 N. E. 238 (1903) (Massachusetts does not
follow the doctrine of anticipatory breach).
The question of anticipatory breach as applied to insurance contracts was
discussed but not decided in Schwarzbach v. Protective Union, 25 W. Va. 622
(1885).
GBallantine, Anticipatory Breach and the Enforcement of Contractual
Duties (1924) 22 Momn. L. Rxv. 329, 335 (desirability of an immediate right
of action upon repudiation of insurance contracts).
6 Ga Nun v. Palmer, 202 N. Y. 483, 96 N. E. 99 (1911), 36 L. R. A. (N. s.)
922 (1912); Heniy v. Rowell, 64 N. Y. S. 488 (1900); McCurry v. Purgason,
170 N. C. 463, 87 S. E. 244 (1915); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1937)
§ 2027.
7Laegerloef Trading Co., Inc. v. Amer. Paper Products Co., 291 Fed. 947
(C. C. A. 7th, 1923); 2 WILLSToN, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 585(e); Limburg,
Anticipatory Bepudiation of Contracts (1925) 10 CORN. L. Q. 135. (Some
cases take the view that T must exercise his right to sue on the contract for
the anticipatory repudiation within a "reasonable" time. "However, in no
case has it actually been held that the promisor has exceeded the time allowed
him for election.") But of. Paducah Cooperage Co. v. Arkansas Stave Co.,
193 Ky. 774, 237 S. W. 412 (1922); Winter v. Amer. Aniline Products, 236
N. Y. 199, 140 N. E. 561 (1923).
8 McCurry v. Purgason, 107 N. C. 463, 87 S. E. 244 (1915); Matlock v.
Gulf, 70 S. W. (2d) 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); Penn. Co. v. Good, 56 Ind.
App. 562, 103 N. E. 672 (1913) ; Note (1935) 94 A. L. R. 455; 2 WILLISTON,

CONTRAOS (1931) § 2027; Ballantine, supra n. 5; Limburg, supra n. 7.
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the theory that the contract was terminated by the breach, the
date of such breach marks the time when the cause of action
9
accrued without regard to the time of the election. The promisee
holds the promisor to his anticipatory breach and bases his action
1
on the wrongful act of the promisor whenever it was committed. "
The principal case adopts the opposite view, measuring tbke period
of limitation from the actual election to rescind on the theory that
the promisee is not bound to exercise his right to rescission and restitution and his cause of action does not accrue until he has made
1
Until termanifest his election to treat the contract as ended.
void 12
not
but
voidable
existence,
minated, the contract is still in
and the promisee sleeps on no present right of action which the
Statute could bar. It may be argued that it is preferable to allow
the injured party to rescind at any time prior to the time of performance, thus enabling the promisee to permit the promisor to
repent and perform, and yet preserve his remedy in quasi contract
which in a majority of cases will be less severe on the promisor.
It appears that the obviously just result in the present case
could have been reached upon either theory, as pointed out in the
dissenting opinion 3 since the Statute of Limitations may not be
applied where the one who pleads the Statute has obstructed the
bringing of the action, the Code'" tolling the Statute during the
period of obstruction. Defendant's silence in-regard to the lapsing
of the policies and its continued acceptance of the premiums clearly

9 Penn. Co. v. Good, 56 Imd. App. 562, 103 N. E. 672 (1913).

the
1o The New York court holds that the right to sue on the contract for
anticipatory breach and the right to sue for the actual breach are different
causes of action. A fortiori that court would hold that the right to rescind
and the right to sue for the final breach are different causes of action and that
the statute would run from the breach as against the right to rescind. Winter
v. Amer. Aniline Products, 236 N. Y. 199, 140 N. E. 561 (1923); Henderson
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 235 N. Y. 489, 139 N. E. 580 (1923).
If, however, the Statute does run on the promisee's right to rescind, the
promisee always has his right to sue on the contract for the ultimate breach.
11 Chapman v. County of Douglas, 107 U. S. 348, 2 S. Ct. 62 (1882) ; Sherman v. International Life Ins. Co., 291 Mo. 139, 236 S. W. 634 (1921) ; Richter
v. Union Land & Stock Co., 129 Cal. 367, 62 Pac. 39 (1900).
12 Note that the promisor may still withdraw. his repudiation. Rederiaktiebolaget Amie v. Universal Transp. Co., 250 Fed. 400, 162 C. C. A. 470 (1918) ;
United Press Ass'n v. National Newspaper Ass'n, 237 Fed. 547 (C. C. A. 8th,
1916); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 319; 5 WILLISTON, CONTA TS

(1937) § 1335.

Hatcher dissenting.
14 W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) e. 55, art. 2, § 17.
18 Judge
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constituted positive concealment and obstruction which suspend
A. L.B.
the Statute.15
WiFE'S RIGHT TO SUIT MONEY IN
DECREE AS TO CUSTODY OF CHILDREN.
- W obtained a divorce from H and was granted custody of their
minor children, the circuit court not expressly retaining the case
on its docket for further decree concerning their custody. Five
years later, H petitioned for custody of the children. W appealed
from the decree granting custody to H, and the circuit court ordered H to pay costs of the appeal, including W's attorney's fees,
applying the code section which provides that the court may at
any time after the commencement of the suit make any proper
order compelling the man to pay to the woman any sum necessary
"to enable her to carry on or defend the suit in the trial court or
on appeal should one be taken."' H then petitioned the supreme
court for a writ of prohibition to cancel this order. Petition dismissed. Held, that the statute2 allowing the court granting the divorce to issue its decree fixing custody of the children and later to
alter such decree on petition of either party, creates in the court a
continuing jurisdiction over custody of children; thus, the petition
for modification of the decree is a part of the original divorce suit
and the suit money statute applies, allowing costs to be assessed to
H.' Crouchb v. Easley, Judge.'
It was formerly settled in West Virginia that provisions in a
divorce decree relating to alimony were res judiata unless the
court expressly reserved the right to alter the decree as to such
provision.4 This has supposedly been changed by statute since
1931, so that now power to alter the decree as to alimony is re2
tained in the court without any express reservation to that effect.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE -

ACTION TO MODIFY ORIGINAL

15 Thompson v. Iron Co., 41 W. Va. 574, 23 S. E. 795 (1895); Teter v.
Moore, 80 W. Va. 443, 93 S. E. 342 (1917); Cameron v. Cameron, 111 W. Va.
375, 162 S. E. 173 (1931).
1 W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 13.
2W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 48, art. 2, § 15.
3 192 S. E. 690 (W. Va. 1937).
4 Cariens v. Cariens, 50 W. Va. 113, 40 S. E. 335 (1901) ; Burdette v. Burdette, 109 W. Va. 95, 153 S. E. 150 (1930).
5 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 15. The words "maintenance of
the parties" were added to the statute in 1931, giving the court the power at
any time to alter or modify the divorce decree as to such maintenance. The
Reviser's note to this section states that this is intended to give to the court
the right to make such alterations without expressly reserving this right in the
divorce decree.
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